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Abstract
While consumption habits have been utilised as a means of generating a hump-
shaped output response to monetary policy shocks in sticky-price New Keynesian
economies, there is relatively little analysis of the impact of habits (particularly,
external habits) on optimal policy. In this paper we consider the implications of ex-
ternal habits for optimal monetary policy, when those habits either exist at the level
of the aggregate basket of consumption goods (‘superficial’ habits) or at the level of
individual goods (‘deep’ habits: see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006)). Ex-
ternal habits generate an additional distortion in the economy, which implies that
the flex-price equilibrium will no longer be eﬃcient and that policy faces interest-
ing new trade-oﬀs and potential stabilisation biases. Furthermore, the endogenous
mark-up behaviour, which emerges when habits are deep, can also significantly af-
fect the optimal policy response to shocks, as well as dramatically aﬀecting the
stabilising properties of standard simple rules.
• JEL Codes: E30, E57 and E61
• Key Words: consumption habits, nominal inertia, optimal monetary policy
1 Introduction
Within the benchmark New Keynesian analysis of monetary policy (see, for example,
Woodford (2003)), monetary policy typically influences the economy through the impact
of interest rates on a representative household’s intertemporal consumption decision. It
has often been felt that the purely forward-looking consumption dynamics that such ba-
sic intertemporal consumption decisions imply, are unable to capture the hump-shaped
output response to changes in monetary policy one typically finds in the data. As a
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means of accounting for such patterns, some authors have augmented the benchmark
model with various forms of habits eﬀects in consumption. The habits eﬀects can either
be internal (see for example, Fuhrer (2000), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005),
Leith and Malley (2005)) or external (see, for example, Smets and Wouters (2007))
the latter reflecting a catching up with the Joneses eﬀect whereby households fail to
internalise the externality their own consumption causes on the utility of other house-
holds. Both forms of habits behaviour can help the New Keynesian monetary policy
model capture the persistence found in the data (see, for example Kozicki and Tinsley
(2002)), although the policy implications are likely to be diﬀerent. More recently, Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) oﬀer an alternative form of habits behaviour, which
they label ‘deep’. Deep habits occur at the level of individual goods rather than at the
level of an aggregate consumption basket (‘superficial’ habits). While this distinction
does not aﬀect the dynamic description of aggregate consumption behaviour relative
to the case of superficial habits, it does render the individual firms’ pricing decisions
intertemporal and, in the flexible price economy considered by Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe,
and Uribe (2006), can produce a counter-cyclical mark-up which significantly aﬀects the
responses of key aggregates to shocks.
While the focus of the papers listed above is on the dynamic response of economies
which feature some form of habits, they do not consider the implications for optimal
policy of such an extension. In contrast, Amato and Laubach (2004) consider optimal
monetary policy in a sticky-price New Keynesian economy which has been augmented to
include internal (but superficial) habits. Since the form of habits is internal (households
care about their consumption relative to their own past consumption, rather than the
consumption of other households), there is no additional externality associated with
consumption habits themselves, and, given an eﬃcient steady-state, the flexible price
equilibrium in the neighbourhood of that steady-state remains eﬃcient. Accordingly, as
in the benchmark New Keynesian model, there is no trade-oﬀ between output gap and
inflation stabilisation in the face of technology shocks and interesting policy trade-oﬀs
require the introduction of additional ineﬃciencies (such as mark-up shocks or a desire
for interest rate smoothing).
In this paper we extend the benchmark sticky-price New Keynesian economy to
include external habits in consumption, where these habits can be either superficial or
deep. The focus on external habits implies that there is an externality associated with
fluctuations in consumption which implies that the flexible price equilibrium will not
usually be eﬃcient, thereby creating an additional trade-oﬀ for policy makers, which may
give rise to additional stabilisation biases if policy is constrained to be time consistent.
Such trade-oﬀs will occur whether or not habits are superficial or deep. We also consider
the implications for optimal policy of assuming habits are of the deep kind. Here the
ability of policy to influence the time profile of endogenously determined mark-ups
can significantly aﬀect the monetary policy stance and how it diﬀers across discretion
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and commitment. In addition to examining optimal policy, we also consider how the
introduction of habits aﬀects the conduct of policy through simple rules. We find that
the introduction of deep habits can induce problems of indeterminacy, as the tightening
of monetary policy can induce inflation through variations in mark-up behaviour, such
that an interest rate rule which satisfies the Taylor principle (where nominal interest
rates rise more than one for one with increases in inflation above target) may not be
suﬃcient to ensure determinacy of the local equilibrium. We also consider whether or
not there is a significant role for the output gap in an optimal simple rule given that our
economy contains a major additional externality beyond that associated with nominal
inertia.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in the next section we outline our model with deep
and superficial habits. In section 3 we consider optimal policy under both commitment
and discretion, where the policy-maker’s objective function is derived from a second
order approximation to households’ utility. In section 4 we turn to our analysis of
simple rules, considering both their determinacy properties and, for rules which can
ensure determinacy, their ability to mimic optimal policy. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy is comprised of households, two monopolistically competitive production
sectors, and the government. There is a continuum of final goods that enter the house-
holds’ consumption basket, each final good being produced as an aggregate of a contin-
uum of intermediate goods. Households can either form external consumption habits at
the level of each final good in their basket, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) call
this type of habits ‘deep’, or they can form habits at the level of the consumption basket
- ‘superficial’ habits. Throughout the paper, we use the same terminology. Furthermore,
we assume price inertia at the level of intermediate goods producers. We shall derive a
general model, and note when assuming superficial or deep habits alters the behavioural
equations.
2.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, indexed by k and of measure
1. Households derive utility from consumption of a composite good and disutility from
hours spent working.
Deep Habits When habits are of the deep kind, each household’s consumption basket,
Xkt , is an aggregate of a continuum of habit-adjusted final goods, indexed by i and of
measure 1,
Xkt =
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit − θCit−1
´ η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
,
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where Ckit is household k’s consumption of good i and Cit ≡
R 1
0 C
k
itdk denotes the cross-
sectional average consumption of this good. η is the elasticity of substitution between
habit-adjusted final goods (η > 1), while the parameter θ measures the degree of external
habit formation in the consumption of each individual good i. Setting θ to 0 returns us
to the usual case of no habits.
The composition of the consumption basket is chosen in order to minimize expendi-
tures, and the demand for final goods is
Ckit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Xkt + θCit−1, ∀i
where Pt represents the overall price index (or CPI), defined as an average of final goods
prices, Pt ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−η
it di
´1/(1−η)
. Aggregating across households yields the total demand
for good i, i ∈ [0, 1] ,
Cit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Xt + θCit−1. (1)
Due to the presence of habits, this demand is dynamic in nature, as it depends not
only on current period elements but also on the lagged value of consumption. This, in
turn, will make the pricing/output decisions of the firms producing these final goods,
intertemporal.
Superficial Habits Habits are superficial when they are formed at the level of the ag-
gregate consumption good. Households derive utility from the habit-adjusted composite
good Xkt ,
Xkt = C
k
t − θCt−1
where household k’s consumption, Ckt , is an aggregate of a continuum of final goods
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] ,
Ckt =
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit
´η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
with η the elasticity of substitution between them and Ct−1 ≡
R 1
0 C
k
t−1dk the cross-
sectional average of consumption.
Households decide the composition of the consumption basket to minimize expendi-
tures and the demand for individual good i is
Ckit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Ckt =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η ³
Xkt + θCt−1
´
where Pt ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−η
it di
´ 1
1−η is the consumer price index. The overall demand for good
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i is obtained by aggregating across all households,
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk
=
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Ct. (2)
Unlike the case of deep habits, this demand is not dynamic and the final goods producing
firms will face a static pricing/output decision.
Remainder of the Household’s Problem The remainder of the household’s prob-
lem is the same irrespective of whether or not habits are deep or superficial. Specifically,
households choose the habit-adjusted consumption aggregate, Xkt , hours worked, Nkt ,
and the portfolio allocation, Dkt+1, to maximize expected lifetime utility
E0
∞X
t=0
βt
"¡
Xkt
¢1−σ
1− σ − χ
¡
Nkt
¢1+υ
1 + υ
#
subject to the budget constraintZ 1
0
PitCkitdi+EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 =WtN
k
t +D
k
t +Φ
k
t − T kt (3)
and the usual transversality condition. Et is the mathematical expectation conditional
on information available at time t, β is the discount factor (0 < β < 1) , χ the relative
weight on disutility from time spent working, and σ and υ are the inverses of the in-
tertemporal elasticities of habit-adjusted consumption and work (σ, υ > 0; σ 6= 1). The
household’s period-t income includes: wage income from providing labour services to
intermediate goods producing firms WtNkt , dividends from the monopolistically com-
petitive firms Φkt , and payments on the portfolio of assets Dkt . Financial markets are
complete and Qt,t+1 is the one-period stochastic discount factor for nominal payoﬀs. T kt
are lump-sum taxes collected by the government. In the maximization problem, house-
holds take as given the processes for Ct−1, Wt, Φkt , and T kt , as well as the initial asset
position Dk−1.
The first order conditions for labour and habit-adjusted consumption are:
−
χ
¡
Nkt
¢υ¡
Xkt
¢−σ = wt
and
Qt,t+1 = β
Ã
Xkt+1
Xkt
!−σ
Pt
Pt+1
(4)
where wt ≡ WtPt is the real wage (see Appendix A for further details). The Euler equation
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for consumption can be written as
1 = βEt
"Ã
Xkt+1
Xkt
!−σ
Pt
Pt+1
#
Rt
where R−1t = Et [Qt,t+1] denotes the inverse of the risk-free gross nominal interest rate
between periods t and t+ 1.
2.2 Firms
In this subsection we consider the behaviour of firms. These are split into two kinds:
final and intermediate goods producing firms, respectively. In the case of the former,
their behaviour depends upon the form of demand curve they face, which is dynamic in
the case of deep habits, and static under superficial habits. Intermediate goods firms
produce a diﬀerentiated intermediate good and are subject to nominal inertia in the form
of Calvo (1983) contracts. This structure is adopted for reasons of tractability, allowing
us to easily switch between superficial and deep habits. Additionally, combining optimal
price setting under both Calvo contracts and dynamic demand curves would undermine
the desirable aggregation properties of the Calvo model as each firm given the signal to
re-set prices would set a diﬀerent price dependent on the level of consumption habits
their product enjoyed relative to other firms’. By separating the two pricing decisions we
avoid reintroducing the history-dependence in price setting the Calvo set-up is designed
to avoid.
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
We assume that final goods are produced by monopolistically competitive firms as an
aggregate of a set of intermediate goods (indexed by j), according to the function
Yit =
µZ 1
0
(Yjit)
ε−1
ε dj
¶ ε
ε−1
, (5)
where ε is the constant elasticity of substitution between inputs in production (ε > 1).
Taking as given intermediate goods prices {Pjit}j and subject to the available tech-
nology (5), firms first choose the amount of intermediate inputs {Yjit}j that minimize
production costs
R 1
0 PjitYjitdj. The first order conditions yield the demand functions
Yjit =
µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
Yit, ∀j, ∀i, (6)
where Pmit ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−ε
jit dj
´ 1
1−ε
is the aggregate of intermediate goods prices in sector i
and represents the nominal marginal cost of producing an additional unit of the final
good i. Nominal profits are given by Φit = (Pit − Pmit )Yit. It is important to note
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that this cost-minimisation problem takes the same form whether firms are faced with
consumers whose habits are deep or superficial. However, their pricing decisions will
diﬀer across this dimension. We now examine the pricing decision of final goods firms,
dependent upon whether habits are deep or superficial.
Deep Habits When habits are deep, firms face the dynamic demand from households,
given by expression (1), and their profit maximization problem becomes intertemporal:
the choice of price aﬀects market share and future profits. Therefore, firms choose
processes for Yit and Pit to maximize the present discounted value of expected profits,
Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+sΦit+s, subject to this dynamic demand and the constraint that Cit = Yit.
Qt,t+s is s-step ahead equivalent of the one-period stochastic discount factor in (4). The
first order conditions for Yit and Pit are:
vit = (Pit − Pmit ) + θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1] (7)
and
Yit = vit
"
η
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η−1 Xt
Pt
#
, (8)
where the Lagrange multiplier vit represents the shadow price of producing an addi-
tional unit of the final good i. This shadow value equals the marginal benefit of addi-
tional profits, (Pit − Pmit ), plus the discounted expected payoﬀ from higher future sales,
θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]. Due to the presence of habits in consumption, increasing output by
one unit in the current period leads to an increase in sales of θ in the next period. In
the absence of habits, when θ = 0, the intertemporal eﬀects of higher output disappear
and the shadow price simply equals time-t profits. The other first order condition in
equation (8) says that an increase in price brings additional revenues, Yit, while simul-
taneously causing a decline in demand, given by the term in square brackets and valued
at the shadow value vit.
Superficial Habits Under superficial habits the profit maximization problem of the
final goods firms is the typical static problem whereby firms choose the price to maximize
current profits, Φit = (Pit − Pmit )Yit, subject to the demand for their good (2) and under
the restriction that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price, Cit = Yit. The optimal
price is set at a constant markup, μ = ηη−1 , over the marginal cost,
Pit = μPmit .
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2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
The intermediate goods sectors consist of a continuum of monopolistically competitive
firms indexed by j and of measure 1. Each firm j produces a unique good using only
labour as input in the production process
Yjit = AtNjit. (9)
Total factor productivity, At, aﬀects all firms symmetrically and follows an exogenous
stationary process, lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt, with persistence parameter ρ ∈ (0, 1) and
random shocks εt ∼ iidN
¡
0, σ2A
¢
.
Firms choose the amount of labour that minimizes production costs, (1− κ)WtNjit.
The subsidy κ, financed by lump-sum taxes, is designed to ensure that the long-run
equilibrium is eﬃcient.1 The minimization problem gives a demand for labour Njit =
Yjit
Ajit
and a nominal marginal costMCt = (1− κ) WtAt , which is the same across firms. (See
Appendix A for more details.) Nominal profits are expressed as Φjit ≡ (Pjit −MCt)Yjit.
We further assume that intermediate goods producers are subject to the constraints
of Calvo (1983)-contracts such that, with fixed probability (1− α) in each period, a
firm can reset its price and with probability α the firm retains the price of the previous
period. When a firm can set the price, it does so in order to maximize the present
discounted value of profits, Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦjit+s, and subject to the demand for its own
good (6) and the constraint that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price. Profits are
discounted by the s-step ahead stochastic discount factor Qt,t+s and by the probability
of not being able to set prices in future periods.
Optimally, the relative price satisfies the following relationship:
P ∗jit
Pt
=
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶ Et ∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
³
Pt+s
Pt
´−1 ¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost.
Pmit represents the price at the level of sector i and is an average of intermediate
goods prices within that sector. With α of firms keeping last period’s price and (1− α)
of firms setting a new price, the law of motion of this price index is:
(Pmit )
1−ε = α
¡
Pmit−1
¢1−ε
+ (1− α)
¡
P ∗jit
¢1−ε .
This description of intermediate goods firms is the same irrespective of the nature of
1 In this model, all firms are monopolistically competitive but only intermediate goods producing
firms are subsidized. Still, in steady-state the subsidy level is such that all production ineﬃciencies are
eliminated.
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habits formation.
2.3 The Government
The government collects lump-sum taxes which it rebates to intermediate goods pro-
ducing firms as subsidies, which ensure an eﬃcient long-run level of output. There is no
government spending per se. The government budget constraint is given by
κWtNt = Tt. (10)
In this cashless economy, monetary policy is conducted in optimal fashion, with
the nominal interest rate being the central bank’s policy instrument. However, we also
consider the consequences of the central bank adopting more simple forms of policy,
such as Taylor-type interest rate rules, and explore how closely these simple policy rules
come to the optimal.
2.4 Equilibrium
In the absence of sector-specific shocks or other forms of heterogeneity, final goods
producers are symmetric and so are households. However, symmetry does not apply
to intermediate goods producers who face randomness in price setting. There is a
distribution of intermediate goods prices and aggregate output is therefore determined
as (see Appendix B for details on aggregation)
Yt = At
Nt
∆t
. (11)
∆t ≡
Z 1
0
³
Pjt
Pmt
´−ε
dj is the measure of price dispersion, which can be shown (see Wood-
ford (2003), Chapter 6) to follow an AR(1) process given by
∆t = (1− α)
µ
P ∗t
Pmt
¶−ε
+ α (πmt )
ε∆t−1. (12)
Note that we have two measures of aggregate prices, a producer price index Pmt
and the usual consumer price index Pt, and consequently, there will be two measures of
inflation. We define: πmt ≡
Pmt
Pmt−1
and πt ≡ PtPt−1 . Furthermore, the two inflation variables
are related according to the following relationship
πt = πmt
μt
μt−1
, (13)
where μt ≡ PtPmt is the markup of final goods producers. In the presence of deep habits,
this markup is time-varying. The overall markup in the economy is given by the product
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of markups in the intermediate goods and final goods sectors and equals the inverse of
the real marginal cost,mc−1t =
Pt
MCt . It should be noted that when habits are superficial,
the mark-up in the final goods sectors is constant, μt = μ, and there is no longer any
wedge between consumer price and producer price inflation.
Finally, the aggregate version of the household’s budget constraint (3) combines with
the government budget constraint (10) and the definition of aggregate profits (Φt =
PtYt − (1− κ)WtNt) to obtain the usual aggregate resource constraint,
Yt = Ct. (14)
The equilibrium is then characterized by equations (11) - (14), to which we add
the monetary policy specification (to be detailed in Sections 3 and 4 below) and the
following set of equations:
Consumers:
Xt = Ct − θCt−1 (15)
−χN
υ
t
X−σt
= wt (16)
X−σt = βEt
∙
X−σt+1
Pt
Pt+1
¸
Rt (17)
Government:
κWtNt = Tt (18)
Intermediate goods producers:
(Pmt )
1−ε = α
¡
Pmt−1
¢1−ε
+ (1− α)
¡
P ∗jt
¢1−ε (19)
P ∗jt
Pt
=
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶
K1t
K2t
(20)
where : K1t = X−σt mctμ
−ε
t Yt + αβEt
£
K1t+1πεt+1
¤
(21)
: K2t = X−σt μ
−ε
t Yt + αβEt
£
K2t+1πε−1t+1
¤
(22)
mct = (1− κ)
wt
At
(23)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + εt (24)
Final goods firms:
The diﬀerences in the two economies when habits are deep rather than superficial
emerges in the behaviour of the final goods firms. As noted above, when habits are
superficial they simply adopt a constant mark-up over the price of the bundle of inter-
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mediate goods,
μt = μ. (25)
In contrast, when habits are deep and final goods firms face a dynamic demand curve
for their product, the endogenous time varying mark-up is described by the following
two equations (note that we have written the shadow price of producing final goods in
real terms, i.e. ωt ≡ vtPt ),
ωt =
µ
1− 1
μt
¶
+ θβEt
"µ
Xt+1
Xt
¶−σ
ωt+1
#
(26)
Yt = ηωtXt. (27)
2.5 Solution Method and Model Calibration
In the absence of a closed-form solution, the model’s equilibrium conditions are log-
linearized around the eﬃcient deterministic steady state. The eﬃciency of the steady
state, obtained through the subsidy allocated to intermediate goods producers, allows
us to obtain an accurate expression for welfare involving only second-order terms.
In order to solve the model, we must select numerical values for some key structural
parameters. Table 1 reports our choices, which are similar to those of other studies
using a New Keynesian economy with habits in consumption. The model is calibrated
to a quarterly frequency. We assume zero average inflation (π = 1) and an annual real
rate of interest of 4%, which together imply a discount factor β of 0.9902. The risk
aversion parameter σ is set at 2.0, while υ equals 0.252, and the relative weight on
labour in the utility function χ is assumed to be 3.0. Consistent with the empirical
evidence, the level of price inertia α is set at 0.75 and the degree of market power is
1.21, split approximately equally between the two monopolistically competitive sectors
of our economy. The steady state value of the markup in the final goods sector is given
as, μ =
h
1− (1−θβ)(1−θ)η
i−1
, and depends on both the elasticity of substitution between final
goods η and the degree of habit formation θ. However, the impact of θ on the markup
μ is minimal and we therefore set η = ε = 11. For the habit formation parameter θ, we
use a benchmark value of 0.65, which falls within the range of estimates identified in the
literature3. However, we allow θ to vary in the [0, 1) interval as we conduct sensitivity
analyses of our results. Technology shocks are assumed persistent with persistence
parameter ρ = 0.9 and standard deviation σA = 0.009. Finally, we set the subsidy rate
κ so as to ensure an eﬃcient steady state, κ = 1− 11−θβ
³
1
μ
ε−1
ε
´
.
2υ is the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity. While micro estimates of this elasticity are
rather small, they tend not to fit well in macro models. Here, we follow the macroeconomic literature
and choose a larger value of 4.0.
3Macro-based estimates of habit formation of the superficial type range from 0.59 as in Smets and
Wouters (2003) to very high values of 0.98 as reported by Bouakez, Cardia, and Ruge-Murcia (2005).
For the deep type of habits, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2006) give a value of 0.86. Micro-based
estimates (see, for example, Ravina (2007)) are substantially lower, with a range of 0.29-0.5.
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2.6 Log-linear Representation
Upon log-linearizing and combining the relevant equilibrium conditions, we obtain a
system of equations which characterize the dynamics of the economy in the neighborhood
of the eﬃcient steady state. Firstly, we have the IS curve in terms of habit-adjusted
consumption, bXt = Et bXt+1 − 1σ bRt + 1σEtbπt+1, (28)
and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) written in terms of producer price
inflation bπmt = βEtbπmt+1 + κ (cmct + bμt) (29)
where κ ≡ (1−αβ)(1−α)α and it should be remembered that the markup, μt, is constant
under superficial habits such that, bμt = 0. In contrast, when habits are deep, the
dynamic equation describing changes in the markup can be written as,
bμt = μω (bωt − θβEtbωt+1)− μωθβσ ³ bXt −Et bXt+1´ , (30)
where the shadow value of producing another unit of a final good subject to deep habits
is given by, bωt = bYt − bXt. (31)
And finally, we have the following expressions defining habit-adjusted consumption bXt,
CPI inflation bπt (when habits are deep), and the real marginal cost cmct:
bXt = 1
1− θ
³bYt − θbYt−1´ (32)
bπt = bπmt + bμt − bμt−1 (33)
cmct = σ bXt + υbYt − (1 + υ) bAt. (34)
3 Optimal Policy
In this section we consider the nature of optimal monetary policy in response to technol-
ogy shocks, under both cases of commitment and discretion by the monetary authority.
The central bank’s objective function is given by a second order approximation to the
representative households’ utility (see Appendix E for details),
Γ0 = −
1
2
χN1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
("
σ
µ
1− θ
1− θβ
¶ bX2t + υµbYt − 1 + υυ bAt
¶2#
+
ε
κ
(bπmt )2
)
+ tip+O[2].
= −1
2
χN1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
nh
(δ + υ) bY 2t − 2θδbYt bYt−1 + θ2δbY 2t−1 − 2 (1 + υ) bYt bAti+ εκ(bπmt )2o
+tip+O[2]
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where δ ≡ σ(1−θβ)(1−θ) . The last line was obtained by replacing bXt with its expression
in terms of output. The weights given to the various elements in the objective function
are derived from basic preference parameters, and the presence of the term in inflation
reflects the costs of price dispersion due to nominal inertia. It should be noted that this
objective function applies whether or not habits are deep or superficial.
While this welfare measure has the same basic components (output and inflation) as
the benchmark New Keynesian model (without externalities due to consumption habits),
this welfare measure looks diﬀerent, in that it does not contain a single “output gap”,
defined as the diﬀerence between output and the flex-price level of output. However,
the more complex term in the current set-up is conceptually similar. The output gap
term in the standard analysis captures the extent to which output deviates from its
eﬃcient level (typically because of nominal inertia, rather than any other distortion).
In a model with external habits, there is an additional externality which means that the
flexible price equilibrium is unlikely to be eﬃcient, such that it is not possible to rewrite
output in gap form. Nevertheless, it is possible to show that minimisation of the terms
in square brackets is equivalent to implementing the social planner’s allocation. In other
words, we are still trading oﬀ inflation control against minimising the deviation of the
decentralised equilibrium to that which would be implemented by a benevolent social
planner (see appendix D for the social planner’s problem).
We measure the welfare cost of a particular policy as the fraction of permanent
consumption that must be given up in order to equal welfare in the stochastic economy to
that of the eﬃcient steady state, E
∞P
t=0
βtu (Xt, Nt) = (1− β)−1 u
¡
(1− θ) (1− ξ)C,N
¢
.
Given the utility function adopted, the expression for ξ in percentage terms is
ξ =
"
1− [(1− σ)Υ]
1
1−σ
(1− θ)C
#
× 100,
where Υ ≡ (1− β)W +χN
1+υ
1+υ and W ≡ E
∞P
t=0
βtu (Xt, Nt) represents the unconditional
expectation of lifetime utility in the stochastic equilibrium.
3.1 Optimal Policy under Commitment
If the monetary authority can credibly commit to following its policy plans, it then
chooses the policy that maximizes households’ welfare subject to the private sector’s
optimal behaviour, as summarized in equations (28) - (34), and given the exogenous
process for technology (see Appendix F for details of the policy problem under com-
mitment). We analyze the implications of this policy in terms of impulse responses to
exogenous technology shocks.
Optimal policy faces a trade-oﬀ between output and inflation stabilization in the face
of technology shocks which would not be present with internal habits. With internal
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habits, policy would be loosened to ensure the flexible price equilibrium was recreated
without generating any inflation (see Amato and Laubach (2004)).4 However, when
habits are external, such that one household does not take account of the impact their
increased consumption has on the utility of others, then with one policy instrument
available, the monetary authority cannot simultaneously ensure output is at its eﬃcient
level and inflation is eliminated. Instead, while nominal inertia points to a relaxation of
policy in the face of a positive technology shock to boost output, the consumption exter-
nality suggests that the higher consumption this entails need not be desirable.5 Figure
1 shows that the optimal response of the economy to a positive persistent technology
shock is a positive output gap and an initial decline followed by an increase in inflation
(pluses indicate the benchmark calibration with θ = 0.65) when habits are superficial.
To achieve this outcome, the monetary authority reduces the nominal interest rate
to boost demand to the socially optimal level. Because the policy is expansionary,
we can implicitly say that the ineﬃciency due to price stickiness is dominating in this
case. As the degree of importance of habits increases, inflation stabilisation remains the
primary goal and the policy maker suﬀers a widening output gap due to the consumption
externality.
We turn to the case of deep habits in Figure 2. Holding the monetary policy response
constant, we would expect the slackening of monetary policy to increase the discounted
profits of final goods firms, encouraging them to cut current markups, generating con-
sumption habits in their goods and thereby widening the output gap further. As a
result, the optimal monetary response does not slacken real interest rates by as much
in order to discourage the reduction in mark-ups. In fact, once the degree of habits
passes a certain level, real interest rates actually rise initially, as policy makers seek
to dampen the initial rise in consumption which imposes an undesirably externality on
households. This can be seen in Figure 2, where solid lines depict impulse responses
under the benchmark value of habits, θ = 0.65, and dash lines the responses under an
alternative higher value of θ = 0.75.
3.2 Optimal Policy with Discretion
The previous sub-section examined policy under commitment. It is well known that
not being able to commit to a time-inconsistent policy can give rise to a stabilisation
bias in the New Keynesian economy whereby policy makers cannot obtain the most
favourable tradeoﬀs between output gap and inflation stabilisation. In our economy
with a consumption externality, there may be additional sources of stabilisation bias
which make it interesting to assess the importance of having access to a commitment
4Of course, this is also the case in the New Keynesian model without habits - in the face of technology
shocks, the monetary policy maker can eliminate the output gap without generating inflation.
5Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) show how contractionary tax policy can be used for the purpose of
aligning output with the eﬃcient level in response to technology shocks.
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technology. Appendix F defines the inputs to the iterative algorithm used to compute
time-consistent policy in Soderlind (1999).
Figure 3 contrasts policy under discretion and commitment when habits are super-
ficial. Aside from failing to exploit the expectational benefits of price level control, the
discretionary policy also fails to achieve the initial relative tightening of policy which
mitigates the generation of undesirable habits eﬀects. The desirability of undertaking
the commitment policy emerges in the significantly diﬀerent paths for inflation across
commitment and discretion. The welfare cost of not being able to commit to future
policies amounts to 0.016% of steady state consumption and it is 0.77% higher than
under commitment, in the benchmark case of θ = 0.65.
When we undertake the same comparison in the case of deep habits (see Figure 4),
the time inconsistency problem is even more significant than in the case of superficial
habits. This is because under deep habits there is a stronger desire to tighten policy
initially in order to prevent an undesirable increase in consumption habits, exacerbated
by the profit-maximising cuts in mark-ups by final goods producing firms. In fact,
under commitment, interest rates actually rise initially if the extent of habits formation
exceeds θ = 0.73. Since such a policy is designed to improve policy trade-oﬀs in the
future, it is not possible to engineer such a monetary tightening under time consistent
policy. The costs of not having access to a commitment technology are correspondingly
higher under deep habits, where the welfare costs under discretion are 1.98% higher
than commitment, under the benchmark of θ = 0.65.
4 Simple Rules
Having derived the optimal policy under commitment and discretion for our new Key-
nesian economy with either superficial or deep habits, we now turn to consider the
following simple monetary policy rule,
bRt = φπbπmt + φy bY gapt + φR bRt−1.
This is similar to that considered in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007), but with some
diﬀerences noted below. bRt is the nominal interest rate, bπmt is the rate of inflation in the
intermediate goods sector and bY gapt is the log-deviation of output from the level that
would be chosen by the social planner. The choice of inflation rate does not matter in
the case of superficial habits since consumer and producer price inflation is identical in
this case. However, it does make a diﬀerence in the case of deep habits since endogenous
variations in mark-ups in the final goods sector induce a time-varying wedge between
the two inflation measures. In this case, it is natural to adopt producer price inflation
as the inflation measure in the rule, since this captures the costs of price dispersion in
social welfare (see Appendix E and the discussion of this point in Kirsanova, Leith, and
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Wren-Lewis (2006)).6 We also include a term in the output gap rather than output
itself. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) demonstrate that a term in output plays no role
in an optimally parameterised simple rule, and we wish to assess, in contrast to this
finding, whether there is a role for policy responding to a measure of the ineﬃciency in
the level of output in an economy with a potentially large consumption externality.
In this section we begin by considering the determinacy properties of our simple rule,
under both forms of habit formation. We then turn to consider the welfare maximising
parameterisation of the rule, and assessing to what extent this can mimic the optimal
policy under commitment described above.
Figure 5 details the determinacy properties of this rule when habits are of the superfi-
cial form. Each sub-plot details the combinations of φπ and φy which ensure determinacy
(light grey dots), indeterminacy (blanks) and instability (dark grey stars). Moving from
left to right across subplots increases the degree of interest rate inertia in the rule, φR,
while moving down the page increases the extent of habits formation, θ. Consider the
first sub-plot in the top left hand corner with φR = 0 and θ = 0, which re-states the sta-
bility properties of the original Taylor rule. Here the importance of the Taylor principle
is revealed as φπ > 1 in combination with a non-negative response to the output gap
is a suﬃcient condition for determinacy. Within this region there is limited scope for
compensating for failing to fulfil the Taylor principle through increasing the positive re-
sponse of the interest rate to the output gap, and there is slightly greater scope for using
a more aggressive monetary policy response to compensate for a mildly negative interest
rate response to the output gap. It is also interesting to note that a second region of
determinacy exists where the interest rate rule fails to satisfy the Taylor principle, such
that φπ < 1, and the response to the output gap is strongly negative. This region is not
often discussed in the literature, but is mentioned in Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).
Typically, when monetary policy fails to satisfy the Taylor principle inflation can be
driven by self-fulfilling expectations which are validated by monetary policy. However,
when the output gap response is suﬃciently negative there is an additional destabilising
element in policy, which overturns the excessive stability generated by a passive mon-
etary policy, implying a unique saddlepath where any deviation from that saddlepath
will imply an explosive path for inflation.
As we move down the sub-plots in the first column of Figure 5 we increase the degree
of superficial habits. This means that the output response to both policy and shocks is
more muted as current consumption is increasingly tied to past levels of consumption.
This has two eﬀects on the determinacy properties of the basic Taylor rule. Firstly, a
rule which satisfies the Taylor principle will do so even if the response to the output
gap is increasingly negative. Secondly, the additional instability caused by adopting a
6Furthermore, adopting a rule specified in terms of CPI inflation when habits are of the deep kind
can induce cyclical responses to shocks which are not conducive to mimicing the optimal response to
shocks. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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negative interest rate response to the output gap becomes insuﬃcient to move a passive
interest rate rule to a position of determinacy. Accordingly, the importance of the Taylor
principle is enhanced when consumption is subject to superficial habits eﬀects.
As we move across the page from left to right we increase the extent of interest rate
inertia in the rule. In this case, as Woodford (2001) shows, the Taylor principle needs to
be rewritten in terms of the long-run interest rate response to excess inflation, φπ1−φR > 1.
As a result, the determinacy region in the positive quadrant spreads further into the
adjacent quadrants since a given level of instantaneous policy response to inflation φπ
has a far greater long-run eﬀect.
Finally, when we combine superficial habits eﬀects with interest rate inertia, it be-
comes possible to induce instability in our economy when the rule is passive, φπ1−φR < 1,
and the interest rate response to the output gap is negative, φy < 0. Essentially, the
slow evolution of consumption under habits combined with interest rate inertia and a
perverse policy response to output gaps and inflation serves to induce a cumulative
instability in the model.
Figure 6 constructs a similar set of sub-plots when habits are of the deep, rather
than superficial, kind. If the extent of habits formation is relatively low, the deter-
minacy properties of the model are similar to those observed under superficial habits.
However, when the degree of habits formation exceeds θ > 0.77, then there are some
significant diﬀerences. Firstly, the usual determinacy region in the positive quadrant
disappears and becomes indeterminant. This indeterminacy is linked to the additional
dynamics displayed in the final goods sectors, where the markup is time-varying under
deep habits formation. Suppose economic agents expect an increase in inflation. Given
an active interest rate rule, φπ > 1, this will give rise to a tightening of monetary policy.
Typically, such a policy would lead to a contraction in aggregate demand, invalidating
the inflation expectations. However, in the presence of deep habits, the higher real
interest rates will encourage final goods firms to raise current mark-ups as they dis-
count the lost future sales such price increases would imply more heavily. If the size of
habits eﬀects is suﬃciently large, then this increase in mark-ups can validate the initial
increase in inflationary expectations, leading to self-fulfilling inflationary episodes and
indeterminacy.
Furthermore, the region of instability identified under superficial habits, becomes
determinate when combined with the excessive stability implied by endogenous mark-
up behaviour, such that the only determinant rule in the presence of a large deep habits
eﬀect is where the rule is passive, φπ1−φR < 1, and the policy response to the output gap
is suﬃciently strongly negative.
Optimal Rules Having explored the determinacy properties of the simple rule
described above when embedded in our economy featuring either superficial or deep
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habits, we now turn to consider the optimal parameterisation of the rule in each case.7
In the case of superficial habits and under the benchmark value of θ = 0.65, the optimal
rule implies a lot of interest rate smoothing, with a strong positive response to inflation
but a negative response to the output gap (φπ = 18.47, φy = −0.09, and φR = 0.93).
With this type of optimal monetary policy rule, the economy’s response to a technology
shock essentially replicates the responses obtained under a full commitment policy, as
shown in Figure 7. To explore the intuition underpinning this result, Figure 8 explores
how the optimal policy rule parameters vary with the degree of habits formation, θ.
In the absence of habits eﬀects, in a New Keynesian economy, a positive technology
shock leads to a decrease in inflation and, due to the nominal inertia, an insuﬃciently
large increase in output. Optimally, a decrease in the nominal interest rate stimulates
demand by reducing the real interest rate. This can be achieved by having a very large
coeﬃcient on inflation relative to all other parameters, which essentially allows the simple
policy rule to achieve the flex-price equilibrium with zero inflation and a zero output
gap. As we introduce superficial habits eﬀects, in the face of the same shock households
overconsume and the output gap becomes positive suggesting that policy be tightened
rather than relaxed. This trade-oﬀ, which is not present in the model without external
habits, aﬀects the optimal parameterisation of the simple policy rule. Specifically, as
we increase the degree of habits formation, the optimal parameter on inflation in the
simple rule falls and the extent of interest rate inertia increases. Furthermore, the
negative coeﬃcient on the output gap also falls, eventually turning positive.
A key feature of optimal policy under commitment is price level control where the
optimal policy achieves expectational benefits in seeking to ensure that price level returns
to base following any shock. As the degree of superficial habits formation is increased,
this price level control can be achieved most eﬀectively through a combination of interest
rate inertia and output gap response. Consider the impact of the positive technology
shock depicted in Figure 7. Essentially, the rule is able to maintain a cut in real interest
rates, even when inflation is slightly positive (to undo the price level eﬀects of the initial
fall in inflation), by responding negatively to the persistent positive output gap and
maintaining that stance for longer by increasing the amount of interest rate inertia.
When the degree of habits formation becomes suﬃciently large, the coeﬃcient on the
output gap becomes positive in order to reduce the initial relaxation of policy, and the
degree of interest rate inertia is increased to ensure price level control.
Figure 9 plots the optimal parameters of the simple rule, when the economy features
an increasing level of deep habits formation. When habits are deep there is less of a
desire to cut interest rates initially, to prevent final goods firms’ cutting their mark-
ups and generating even greater consumption externalities. For relatively low levels
7We search across the rule parameter space using the Simplex method employed by the Fminsearch
algorithm in Matlab (see, Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998)) in order to minimise the uncon-
ditional welfare losses associated with the rule.
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of habits, this implies a more muted response to inflation and output gaps. However,
there is a surprising ‘blip’ in the optimal parameters for intermediate levels of the deep
habits eﬀect. At intermediate levels of deep habits this desire to tighten policy is finely
balanced against the need to avoid falls in intermediate goods inflation which induces
undesirable increases in price dispersion. Despite the large rule parameters this implies,
the rule still successfully mimics optimal policy under commitment, and the simple rule
in all cases comes close to achieving the welfare levels observed under commitment - see
Figure 10 for an illustration of impulse responses to a technology shock in the case of
θ = 0.5.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we considered the optimal policy response to technology shocks in a New
Keynesian economy subject to habits eﬀects in consumption. These eﬀects were as-
sumed to be external, such that one household fails to take account of the impact their
consumption behaviour has on other households as each household seeks to ‘catch up
with the Joneses’. This consumption externality needs to be traded-oﬀ against the mon-
etary policy maker’s usual desire to stabilise inflation (a trade-oﬀ which would not exist
if habits were internal) and generates a new form of stabilisation bias as time consistent
policy is unable to mimic the initial policy response under commitment. This framework
is further enriched by allowing the habits eﬀects to be either superficial (at the level of
household’s total consumption) or deep (at the level of individual consumption goods).
Under deep habits, firms face dynamic demand curves which imply an intertemporal
dimension to price setting and endogenous mark-up behaviour. This, in turn, further
modifies the optimal policy response to technology shocks when habits are deep.
In addition to considering optimal policy, we also consider the stabilising proper-
ties of simple rules. We investigate the determinacy properties of such rules and find
that superficial habits eﬀects tend to increase the range of parameters consistent with
determinacy, provided the Taylor principle is satisfied. However, for suﬃciently large
measures of deep habits (which fall within the range of econometric estimates) the Tay-
lor principle ceases to be either a necessary or suﬃcient condition for determinacy. We
demonstrate that optimally parameterised determinate simple rules can typically come
close to achieving the welfare levels observed under optimal commitment policy. Overall
our work suggests that the choice of internal or external habits eﬀects will have non
trivial implications for optimal policy, even if the implied dynamics of the model when
policy is described by an ad hoc rule could be similar (Kozicki and Tinsley (2002)).
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Figure 1: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commit-
ment policy, in the case of superficial habits: θ = 0.4 (dash lines), θ = 0.65 (benchmark
value, pluses), θ = 0.75 (solid lines).
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Figure 2: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock under optimal commit-
ment policy, in the case of deep habits for θ = 0.65 (benchmark value, solid lines) and
θ = 0.75 (dash lines).
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Figure 3: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of superficial
habits under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash
lines).
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Figure 4: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the case of deep habits
under optimal policy with commitment (solid lines) and with discretion (dash lines).
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Figure 5: Determinacy properties of the model with superficial habits, when monetary
policy follows the rule bRt = φπbπmt + φy bY gapt + φR bRt−1: determinacy (light grey dots),
indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 6: Determinacy properties of the model with deep habits, when monetary pol-
icy follows the rule bRt = φπbπmt + φy bY gapt + φR bRt−1: determinacy (light grey dots),
indeterminacy (blanks), and instability (dark grey stars).
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Figure 7: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with su-
perficial habits with θ = 0.65, under the optimal Taylor rule (solid lines) and optimal
commitment policy (dash lines).
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Figure 8: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of superficial habits.
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Figure 9: Optimal policy rule parameters for varying degrees of deep habits.
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Figure 10: Impulse responses to a 1% positive technology shock in the model with deep
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A Analytical Details
A.1 Households
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-
ket to minimize expenditures
min
{Ckit}i
Z 1
0
PitCkitdi
s.t.
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit − θCit−1
´ η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
≥ Xkt
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Xkt + θCit−1,
where Pt is the overall price level, expressed as an aggregate of the good i prices, Pt =³R 1
0 P
1−η
it di
´ 1
1−η .
Utility Maximization The solution to the utility maximization problem is ob-
tained by solving the Lagrangian function,
L = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
h
u
³
Xkt , N
k
t
´
− λkt
³
PtXkt + Ptϑt +EtQt,t+1D
k
t+1 −WtNkt −Dkt −Φkt + T kt
´i
.
In the budget constraint, we have re-expressed the total spending on the consumption
basket,
R 1
0 PitC
k
itdi, in terms of quantities that aﬀect the household’s utility,Z 1
0
PitCkitdi = PtX
k
t + Ptϑt
where under deep habits ϑt is given as ϑt ≡ θ
R 1
0
³
Pit
Pt
´
Cit−1di, while under superfi-
cial habits it takes the simpler form, ϑt ≡ θCt−1. Households take ϑt as given when
maximising utility.
The first order conditions are then,¡
Xkt
¢
: uX(t) = λktPt¡
Nkt
¢
: −uN (t) = uX(t) WtPt¡
Dkt
¢
: 1 = βEt
h
uX(t+1)
uX(t)
Pt
Pt+1
i
Rt
where Rt = 1Et[Qt,t+1] is the one-period gross return on nominal riskless bonds.
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With utility given by u (X,N) = X
1−σ
1−σ − χ
N1+υ
1+υ , the first derivatives are
uX (·) = X−σ and uN (·) = −χNυ.
A.2 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers choose the amount of intermediate inputs to minimize the cost
of production subject to the available technology
min
{Yjit}j
Z 1
0
PjitYjitdj
s.t.
µZ 1
0
(Yjit)
ε−1
ε dj
¶ ε
ε−1
≥ Y it
The resulting demand functions are:
Yjit =
µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
Yit, ∀j (35)
where Pmit =
³R 1
0 P
1−ε
jit dj
´ 1
1−ε is an aggregate of intermediate goods prices. Profits are
defined as: Φit ≡ PitYit −
R 1
0 PjitYjitdj = (Pit − Pmit )Yit.
Due to the dynamic nature of the demand they face, final goods producers choose
both price and quantity to maximize the present discounted value of profits, under the
restriction that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price (Cit = Yit):
max
{Pit, Yit}
Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+sΦit+s = Et
∞X
s=0
Qt,t+s
¡
Pit+s − Pmit+s
¢
Yit+s
s.t.Yit+s =
µ
Pit+s
Pt+s
¶−η
Xt+s + θYit+s−1
Qt,t+s = βs
µ
Xt+s
Xt
¶−σ Pt
Pt+s
The first order conditions are:
vit = (Pit − Pmit ) + θEt [Qt,t+1vit+1]
and
Yit = vit
"
η
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η−1 Xt
Pt
#
where vit is the Lagrange multiplier on the dynamic demand constraint and represents
the shadow price of producing good i.
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A.3 Intermediate Goods Producers
The cost minimization of brand producers involves the choice of labour inputNjit subject
to the available production technology
min
Njit
(1− κ)WtNjit
s.t. AtNjit = Yjit
Costs are subsidized at rate κ, which is determined to ensure that the long-run equilib-
rium of the economy is eﬃcient. The minimization problem implies a labour demand,
Njit =
Yjit
At , and a nominal marginal cost which is the same across all brand producing
firms MCt = (1− κ) WtAt . Profits are defined as:
Φjit ≡ PjitYjit − (1− κ)WtNjit = PjitYjit − (1− κ)Wt
Yjit
At
= (Pjit −MCt)Yjit
The profit maximization is subject to the Calvo-style of price setting behavior where,
with fixed probability (1− α) each period, a firm can set its price and with probability α
the firm keeps the price from the previous period. When a firm can set the price it does
so in order to maximize the present discounted value of profits, subject to the demand
for its own goods. Profits are discounted by the stochastic discount factor, adjusted for
the probability of not being able to set prices in future periods:
max
P∗jit
Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+sΦjit+s = Et
∞X
s=0
αsQt,t+s
£¡
P ∗jit −MCt+s
¢
Yjit+s
¤
s.t.Yjit+s =
µ P ∗jit
Pmit+s
¶−ε
Yit+s
Qt,t+s = βs
µ
Xt+s
Xt
¶−σ Pt
Pt+s
Optimally, the relative price is set at
P ∗jit
Pt
=
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶ Et ∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
³
Pt+s
Pt
´−1 ¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
where mct = MCtPt is the real marginal cost. The relative price can also be expressed as
P ∗jit
Pt
=
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶
K1t
K2t
32
where K1t and K2t have a recursive representation:
K1t ≡ Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σmct+s
¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
= X−σt mct μ
−ε
t Yt + αβEt
£
K1t+1πεt+1
¤
and
K2t ≡ Et
∞X
s=0
(αβ)s (Xt+s)−σ
µ
Pt+s
Pt
¶−1 ¡
Pmit+s
¢ε Yit+s
= X−σt μ
−ε
t Yt + αβEt
£
K2t+1πε−1t+1
¤
B Equilibrium Conditions
B.1 Aggregation and Symmetry
Aggregate Output: The market clearing condition at the level of intermediate
goods is µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
Yit = AtNjit, ∀j, ∀i
which, upon aggregation across the j firms, becomes:
Yit∆it = AtNit, ∀i
where ∆it ≡
Z 1
0
³
Pjit
Pmit
´−ε
dj represents intermediate goods price dispersion in sector i.
With final goods producing sectors being symmetric, we can drop the i subscript and
write the aggregate production function as
Yt = At
Nt
∆t
.
Aggregate Profits: The economy wide profits are given by the aggregate profits
from final goods producers and intermediate goods producers:
Φt =
Z 1
0
Φitdi+
Z 1
0
Z 1
0
Φjitdjdi
=
Z 1
0
PitYitdi− (1− κ)WtNt
= PtYt − (1− κ)WtNt
where we have used the assumption of symmetric final goods sectors to obtain the final
result.
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B.2 System of Non-linear Equations
Xt = Ct − θCt−1 (36)
−uN (t)
uX (t)
=
Wt
Pt
≡ wt (37)
uX (t) = βEt
£
uX (t+ 1) π−1t+1 Rt
¤
(38)
Yt = ηωtXt (39)
ωt =
µ
1− 1
μt
¶
+ θβEt
∙
uX (t+ 1)
uX (t)
ωt+1
¸
(40)
Yt =
At
∆t
Nt (41)
Yt = Ct (42)
∆t ≡
Z 1
0
µ
Pjt
Pmt
¶−ε
dj = (1− α)
µ P ∗jt
Pmt
¶−ε
+ α (πmt )
ε∆t−1 (43)
(Pmt )
1−ε = α
¡
Pmt−1
¢1−ε
+ (1− α)
¡
P ∗jt
¢1−ε (44)
P ∗jt
Pt
=
µ
ε
ε− 1
¶
K1t
K2t
(45)
where : K1t = uX (t)mctμ−εt Yt + αβEt
£
K1t+1πεt+1
¤
(46)
: K2t = uX (t)μ−εt Yt + αβEt
£
K2t+1πε−1t+1
¤
(47)
mct = (1− κ)
Wt/Pt
At
(48)
πmt = πt
μt−1
μt
(49)
lnAt = ρ lnAt−1 + t (50)
Definitions:
πt ≡
Pt
Pt−1
πmt ≡
Pmt
Pmt−1
μt ≡
Pt
Pmt
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B.3 The Deterministic Steady State
The non-stochastic long-run equilibrium is characterized by constant real variables and
nominal variables growing at a constant rate. The equilibrium conditions (36) - (50)
reduce to:
X = (1− θ)C (51)
χNυXσ = w (52)
1 = β
¡
Rπ−1
¢
= βr (53)
ω = [(1− θ) η]−1 (54)
μ = [1− (1− θβ)ω]−1 (55)
Y = A
N
∆
(56)
Y = C (57)
∆ =
1− α
1− α (πm)ε
µ
P ∗
P
¶−ε
μ−ε (58)
1 = α (πm)ε−1 + (1− α)
µ
P ∗
P
¶1−ε
μ1−ε (59)
P ∗
P
=
ε
ε− 1
K1
K2
=
∙
ε
ε− 1
1− αβπε−1
1− αβπε
¸
mc (60)
K1 =
uX mc μ−εY
1− αβπε (61)
K2 =
uX μ−εY
1− αβπε−1 (62)
mc = (1− κ) w
A
(63)
πm = π
A = 1
Table 1 contains the imposed calibration restrictions. We assume values for the
real interest rate, the Frisch labour supply elasticity, the steady state inflation, and the
following parameters, σ, η, ε, α, θ, and χ. The discount factor β matches the assumed
real rate of interest, β = r−1, while, given the specification of the utility function, υ is
the inverse of the Frisch labour supply elasticity, Nw = 1υ .
The steady state values of the shadow price ω and the markup μ are given by
equations (54) and (55). The relative price P
∗
P can then be obtained from equation (59)
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as,
P ∗
P
=
∙
1
1− α
³
1− α (πm)ε−1
´¸ 11−ε
μ−1.
while equation (58) gives the steady state value of price dispersion ∆ and, from equation
(60), the marginal cost is
mc =
µ
P ∗
P
¶ ∙
ε
ε− 1
1− αβπε−1
1− αβπε
¸−1
.
Under the assumption of zero steady state inflation (π = πm = 1), the following long-run
equilibrium expressions simplify to:
P ∗
P
=
1
μ
∆ = 1
mc =
1
μ
µ
ε− 1
ε
¶
.
To determine the steady state value of labour, we substitute for X in terms of
Y in (52) and then, using the aggregate production function, we obtain the following
expression,
χNσ+υ [(1− θ)A]σ = w, (64)
which can be solved for N . Note that this expression depends on the real wage w, which
can be obtained from equation (63). However, in order to make the long-run equilibrium
eﬃcient, we impose the condition
w = 1− θβ.
This condition is equivalent to setting the cost subsidy κ so as to ensure that the allo-
cation under the decentralized equilibrium (64) matches the social planner’s allocation
(75), i.e. κ = 1− 11−θβ
³
1
μ
ε−1
ε
´
. See Appendix D for the social planner’s problem.
Finally, equations (56), (57), and (51) can be solved for aggregate output Y , con-
sumption C and habit-adjusted consumption X.
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B.4 System of Log-linear Equations
Log-linearizing the equilibrium conditions (36) - (50) around the eﬃcient deterministic
steady state with zero inflation gives the following set of equations:
bXt = (1− θ)−1 ³ bCt − θ bCt−1´
σ bXt + υ bNt = bwt (65)
bXt = Et bXt+1 − 1σ ³ bRt −Etbπt+1´bYt = bωt + bXt
bωt = 1μωbμt + θβEtbωt+1 + θβσ ³ bXt −Et bXt+1´bYt = bAt + bNt − b∆t (66)bYt = bCtb∆t = αb∆t−1bPmt = α bPmt−1 + (1− α) bP ∗t (67)
bP ∗t − bPt = bK1t − bK2t
where : bK1t = (1− αβ)³−σ bXt + cmct − εbμt + bYt´+ αβEt h bK1t+1 + εbπt+1i
: bK2t = (1− αβ)³−σ bXt − εbμt + bYt´+ αβEt h bK2t+1 + (ε− 1) bπt+1i
Upon substitution of the expressions in bK1t and bK2t, we obtain the following expression
bP ∗t − bPt = αβEt ³ bP ∗t+1 − bPt+1´+ αβEtbπt+1 + (1− αβ) cmct (68)
cmct = bwt − bAt
bπt = bπmt + bμt − bμt−1 (69)bAt = ρA bAt−1 + εAt
and, finally the following definitions
bπt = bPt − bPt−1
bπmt = bPmt − bPmt−1
bμt = bPt − bPmt .
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Combine equations (68), (67), (69), together with the definitions of producer price
inflation and markup to obtain a New Keynesian Phillips Curve in terms of producer
inflation bπmt = βEtbπmt+1 + ∙(1− αβ) (1− α)α
¸
(cmct + bμt) ,
while the real marginal cost can be re-written as
cmct = σ bXt + υbYt − (1 + υ) bAt,
where we have used the first order conditions (65) to substitute for the real wage bwt,
and the production function (66) and the fact that price dispersion in the linear model
is deterministic to write bNt = bYt − bAt.
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C Model with Superficial Habits
C.1 Households
Habits are “superficial” when they are formed at the level of the aggregate consumption
good. Households derive utility from the habit-adjusted composite good Xkt ,
Xkt = C
k
t − θCt−1
where household k’s consumption, Ckt , is an aggregate of a continuum of final goods,
indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] ,
Ckt =
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit
´η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
with η > 1 the elasticity of substitution between them and Ct−1 ≡
R 1
0 C
k
t−1dk the cross-
sectional average of consumption.
Cost Minimization Households decide the composition of the consumption bas-
ket to minimize expenditures
min
{Ckit}i
Z 1
0
PitCkitdi
s.t.
µZ 1
0
³
Ckit
´ η−1
η di
¶ η
η−1
≥ Ckt
The demand for individual goods i is
Ckit =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Ckt
where Pt ≡
³R 1
0 P
1−η
it di
´ 1
1−η
is the consumer price index. The overall demand for good
i is obtained by aggregating across all households
Cit =
Z 1
0
Ckitdk =
µ
Pit
Pt
¶−η
Ct. (70)
Unlike in the case of deep habits, this demand is not dynamic.
C.2 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers’ cost minimization problem is unchanged. However, the profit
maximization is the typical static problem whereby firms choose the price to maximize
current profits, Φit = (Pit − Pmit )Yit, subject to the demand for their good (70) and
under the restriction that all demand be satisfied at the chosen price (Cit = Yit). The
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optimal price is set at a constant markup, μ = ηη−1 , over the marginal cost,
Pit = μPmit .
C.3 Equilibrium
With a constant markup in the final goods sectors, the system of equilibrium conditions
(36) - (50) in appendix B changes along the following dimensions: in a symmetric
equilibrium, producer price inflation equals CPI inflation, πt = πmt . We impose a
constant markup, μt = μ, in the pricing equation of intermediate goods firms and we
exclude equations (39) and (40), which are no longer valid under constant markup at
the level of final goods producers.
In this setup, we obtain the familiar looking New Keynesian Phillips Curve,
bπt = βEtbπt+1 + κcmct, κ ≡ (1− αβ) (1− α)α , (71)
to which we add the IS curve
bXt = Et bXt+1 − 1σ bRt + 1σEtbπt+1 (72)
and two equations defining real marginal cost and habit-adjusted consumption,
bXt = 1
1− θ
³bYt − θbYt−1´ (73)
cmct = σ bXt + υbYt − (1 + υ) bAt. (74)
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D The Social Planner’s Problem
The subsidy level that ensures an eﬃcient long-run equilibrium is obtained by comparing
the steady state solution of the social planner’s problem with the steady state obtained
in the decentralized equilibrium. The social planner ignores the nominal inertia and
all other ineﬃciencies and chooses real allocations that maximize the representative
consumer’s utility subject to the aggregate resource constraint, the aggregate production
function, and the law of motion for habit-adjusted consumption:
max
{X∗t ,C∗t ,N∗t }
E0
∞X
t=0
βtu (X∗t , N
∗
t )
s.t. Y ∗t = C
∗
t
Y ∗t = AtN
∗
t
X∗t = C
∗
t − θC∗t−1
The optimal choice implies the following relationship between the marginal rate
of substitution between labour and habit-adjusted consumption and the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution in habit-adjusted consumption
χ (N∗t )
υ
(X∗t )
−σ = At
"
1− θβEt
µ
X∗t+1
X∗t
¶−σ#
.
The steady state equivalent of this expression can be written as,
χ (N∗)υ+σ [(1− θ)A]σ = A (1− θβ) . (75)
The dynamics of this model are driven by technology shocks to the system of equilib-
rium conditions composed of the Euler equation, the resource contraint and the evolution
of habit-adjusted consumption. In log-linear form, these are:
bX∗t = θβEt bX∗t+1 + 1− θβσ ³−υ bN∗t + bAt´
bY ∗t = bAt + bN∗t
bX∗t = 11− θ ³bY ∗t − θbY ∗t−1´ ,
which combined yield the following dynamic equation
bY ∗t = θβζEt bY ∗t+1 + θζ bY ∗t−1 +µ1 + υδ
¶
ζ bAt
where ζ ≡
¡
1 + θ2β + υδ
¢−1
and δ ≡ σ(1−θβ)(1−θ) . In the absence of deep habits, θ = 0,
the model reduces to the basic New Keynesian model where bY ∗t = ³ 1+υσ+υ´ bAt.
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E Derivation of Welfare
Individual utility in period t is
X1−σt
1− σ − χ
N1+υt
1 + υ
where Xt = Ct−θCt−1 is the habit-adjusted aggregate consumption. Before considering
the elements of the utility function, we need to note the following general result relating
to second order approximations
Yt − Y
Yt
= bYt + 1
2
bY 2t +O[2]
where bYt = ln ¡YtY ¢ and O[2] represents terms that are of order higher than 2 in the
bound on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. This will be used in various places in
the derivation of welfare. Now consider the second order approximation to the first
term,
X1−σt
1− σ = X
1−σ
µ
Xt −X
X
¶
− σ
2
X1−σ
µ
Xt −X
X
¶2
+ tip+O[2]
where tip represents ‘terms independent of policy’. Using the results above this can be
rewritten in terms of hatted variables
X1−σt
1− σ = X
1−σ
½ bXt + 1
2
(1− σ) bX2t ¾+ tip+O[2].
In pure consumption terms, the value of Xt can be approximated to second order
by: bXt = 1
1− θ
µbCt + 1
2
bC2t¶− θ1− θ
µbCt−1 + 1
2
bC2t−1¶− 12 bX2t +O[2]
To a first order, bXt = 1
1− θ
bCt − θ
1− θ
bCt−1 +O[1]
which implies bX2t = 1(1− θ)2 ³ bCt − θ bCt−1´2 +O[2]
Therefore,
X1−σt
1− σ = X
1−σ
½
1
1− θ
µbCt + 1
2
bC2t¶− θ1− θ
µbCt−1 + 1
2
bC2t−1¶+ 12 (−σ) bX2t
¾
+tip+O[2]
Summing over the future,
∞X
t=0
βt
X1−σt
1− σ = X
1−σ
∞X
t=0
βt
½
1− θβ
1− θ
µbCt + 1
2
bC2t ¶− 12σ bX2t
¾
+ tip+O[2].
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The term in labour supply can be written as
χN1+υt
1 + υ
= χN1+υ
½ bNt + 1
2
(1 + υ) bN2t ¾+ tip+O[2]
Now we need to relate the labour input to output and a measure of price dispersion.
Aggregating the individual firms’ demand for labour yields
Nt =
Z 1
0
µ
Yit
At
¶Z 1
0
µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
djdi.
Note that in the absence of any sector specific shocks or heterogeneity, Yit = Yt. It can
be shown (see Woodford (2003), Chapter 6) that
bNt = bYt − bAt + ln"Z 1
0
µ
Pjit
Pmit
¶−ε
di
#
= bYt − bAt + ε
2
varj{pjit}+O[2]
so we can write
χN1+υt
1 + υ
= χN1+υ
½bYt + 1
2
(1 + υ) bY 2t − (1 + υ) bYt bAt + ε2varj{pjit}
¾
+ tip+O[2]
Welfare is then given by
Γ0 = X
1−σE0
∞X
t=0
βt
½
1− θβ
1− θ
µbCt + 1
2
bC2t ¶− 12σXˆ2t
¾
−χN1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
½bYt + 1
2
(1 + υ) bY 2t − (1 + υ) bYt bAt + ε2varj{pjit}
¾
+tip+O[2]
From the social planner’s problem we know, X−σ(1− θβ) = χNυ such that X1−σ(1−
θβ) = (1 − θ)χN1+υ. If we use the appropriate subsidy to render the steady-state
eﬃcient and the second order approximation to the national accounting identity,
bCt = bYt − 1
2
bC2t + 12 bY 2t +O[2],
43
we can eliminate the level terms and rewrite the loss function as
Γ0 = χN
1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
½
−1
2
σ
µ
1− θ
1− θβ
¶ bX2t ¾
−χN1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
½
1
2
υbY 2t − (1 + υ)bYt bAt + ε2varj{pjit}
¾
+tip+O[2]
Using the result from Woodford (2003) that
∞X
t=0
βtvarj{pjit} = α
(1− α)(1− αβ)
∞X
t=0
βt (bπmt )2 + tip+O[2]
we can write the discounted sum of utility as,
Γ0 = −
1
2
χN1+υE0
∞X
t=0
βt
(
σ
µ
1− θ
1− θβ
¶ bX2t + υµbYt − 1 + υυ bAt
¶2
+
αε
(1− α)(1− αβ)(bπmt )2
)
+tip+O[2]
Note that due to the dynamic nature of the social planner’s problem it is not as straight-
forward to rewrite the welfare function in the usual “gap” form.
E.1 Welfare Measure
We measure welfare as the unconditional expectation of lifetime utility in the stochastic
equilibrium,
W = E
∞X
t=0
βtu (Xt, Nt)
=
1
1− β
⎧
⎨
⎩u−
1
2
χN1+υ
⎡
⎣
¡
δ + υ + θ2δ
¢
var
³bYt´− 2θδcov ³bYt, bYt−1´− 2 (1 + υ) cov ³bYt, bAt´
+(1 + υ) var
³ bAt´+ εκvar(bπmt )
⎤
⎦
⎫
⎬
⎭
with κ ≡ (1−αβ)(1−α)α , δ ≡
σ
(1−θβ)(1−θ) , and u the steady-state level of the momentary
utility. To obtain the above expression we have used the second order approximation
of utility derived above (inclusive of tip terms) and also imposed the condition that
var
³bYt´ = var ³bYt−1´.
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F Optimal Policy: Commitment
Upon substitution of the habit-adjusted consumption term, the central bank’s objective
function becomes
1
2
ΩE0
∞X
t=0
βt
h
(δ + υ) bY 2t − 2θδbYt bYt−1 + θ2δbY 2t−1 − 2 (1 + υ) bYt bAt + εκ(bπmt )2i
where Ω ≡ χN1+υ and δ ≡ σ(1−θβ)(1−θ) and we re-write the constraints as,µ
1 + θ
1− θ
¶ bYt = 1
1− θEt
bYt+1 + 1σEt ¡bπmt+1 + bμt+1¢+ θ1− θ bYt−1 − 1σ ³ bRt + bμt´
bπmt = βEtbπmt+1 − κ1bYt − κ2bYt−1 − κ3 bAt + κbμt
bμt = γ1βEtbYt+1 − γ2 bYt − γ3bYt−1
where
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
κ ≡ (1−αβ)(1−α)α
κ1 ≡ −κ
³
σ
1−θ + υ
´
κ2 ≡ κ σθ1−θ
κ3 ≡ κ (1 + υ)
and
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
γ ≡ μω θ1−θ
γ1 ≡ γ (θ + σ)
γ2 ≡ γ [1 + θβ + βσ (1 + θ)]
γ3 ≡ −γ (1 + θβσ)
We can then form the Lagrangian function defining the policy problem under commit-
ment as:
L = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
2Ω
h
− (δ + υ) bY 2t + 2θδbYt bYt−1 − θ2δbY 2t−1 + 2 (1 + υ) bYt bAt − εκ(bπmt )2i
−ςt
h³
1+θ
1−θ
´ bYt − 11−θ bYt+1 − 1σ ¡bπmt+1 + bμt+1¢− θ1−θ bYt−1 + 1σ ³ bRt + bμt´i
−ϕt
hbπmt − βbπmt+1 + κ1bYt + κ2bYt−1 + κ3 bAt − κbμti
−νt
hbμt − γ1β bYt+1 + γ2bYt + γ3bYt−1i
⎫
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎭
The government chooses paths for bRt, bYt, bπmt , and bμt. The first order condition with
respect to the nominal interest rate gives:
−σ−1E0βtςt = 0, ∀t ≥ 0 (76)
which implies that the IS curve is not binding and it can therefore be excluded from
the optimization problem. Once the optimal rules for the other variables have been
obtained, we use the IS curve to determine the path of the nominal interest rate. So,
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the central bank now chooses
nbYt, bπmt , bμto. The Lagrangian takes the form:
L = E0
∞X
t=0
βt
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1
2Ω
h
− (δ + υ) bY 2t + 2θδbYtbYt−1 − θ2δbY 2t−1 + 2 (1 + υ) bYt bAt − εκ(bπmt )2i
−ϕt
hbπmt − βbπmt+1 + κ1bYt + κ2bYt−1 + κ3 bAt − κbμti
−νt
hbμt − γ1β bYt+1 + γ2bYt + γ3bYt−1i
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
.
The first order condition for the markup, μˆt, gives the relationship between the two
Lagrange multipliers,
νt = κϕt,
while for inflation we have the rather usual expression
bπmt = − κεΩ ¡ϕt − ϕt−1¢ .
The first order condition for output is
−Ωδζ−1bYt+ΩδθbYt−1+Ω (1 + υ) bAt−κ1ϕt−γ2νt+γ1νt−1+βEt hΩδθbYt+1 − κ2ϕt+1 − γ3νt+1i = 0
which, after eliminating νt based on the above expression relating Lagrange multipliers
and collecting terms, becomes
ζ−1bYt+µκ1 + κγ2δΩ
¶
ϕt = θβEt bYt+1−µκ2 + κγ3δΩ
¶
βEtϕt+1+θbYt−1+κγ1δΩ ϕt−1+
µ
1 + υ
δ
¶ bAt
(77)
where ζ ≡
¡
1 + θ2β + υδ
¢−1
.
Under full commitment, the central bank ignores past commitments in the first
period by setting all pre-existing conditions to zero, bY−1 = 0 and ϕ−1 = 0. To find the
solution, we solve the system of equations composed of the first order conditions, the
three constraints, and the technology shock.
F.1 Optimal Policy: Discretion
In order to solve the time-consistent policy problem we employ the iterative algorithm
of Soderlind (1999), which follows Currie and Levine (1993) in solving the Bellman
equation. The per-period objective function can be written in matrix form as Z 0tQZt,
where Zt+1 =
h bAt+1 bYt Et bYt+1 Etbμt+1 Etbπmt+1 i0 and
Q =
1
2
Ω
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0 − (1 + υ) 0 0
0 θ2δ −θδ 0 0
− (1 + υ) −θδ (δ + υ) 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 εκ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
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and the structural description of the economy is given by,
Zt+1 = AZt +But + ξt+1,
where ut =
h bRti, ξt+1 = h εAt+1 0 0 0 0 i0, A ≡ A−10 A1, B ≡ A−10 B0,
A0 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0
0 0 βγ1 0 0
0 0 11−θ σ
−1 σ−1
0 0 0 0 β
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
, A1 =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρ 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 γ3 γ2 1 0
0 − θ1−θ
1+θ
1−θ σ
−1 0
κ3 κ2 κ1 −κ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and
B0 =
h
0 0 0 σ−1 0
i0
.
This completes the description of the required inputs for Soderlind (1999)’s Matlab code
which computes optimal discretionary policy.
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Parameter Value Description
r (1.04)1/4 Real interest rate
σ 2 Inverse of intertemporal elasticity of substitution
η 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across final goods
ε 11.0 Elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods
α 0.75 Degree of price stickiness
θ 0.65 Degree of habit formation
Nw 4.0 Frisch labour supply elasticity
χ 3.0 Relative weight on labour in the utility function
π 1 Gross CPI inflation rate in steady-state
ρ 0.9 Persistence of exogenous shocks
σA 0.009 Standard deviation of exogenous shocks
Table 1: Parameter values used in simulations
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